Showing posts with label clinical gestalt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label clinical gestalt. Show all posts

Friday, October 4, 2013

Tools in the ED - Clinical Decision Instrument Basics

The Gist:  Clinical decision instruments (CDIs) are all the rage in Emergency Medicine, especially for trainees still developing gestalt; however, these tools often require proper understanding and finesse for correct utilization.  FOAM (Free Open Access Medical education) sources such as Dr. Radecki's posts on NEXUS, PECARN abdominal trauma, and the Ottawa SAH Rule as well as Dr. Spiegel's post on the Ottawa SAH Rule have helped hone the way I think about and utilize decision aids. This editorial in Annals of Emergency Medicine (podcast here) is a concise, excellent synopsis of questions to ask when evaluating CDIs.

CDIs are tools, not rules.  These are typically derived through statistical methods in discrete populations. While the tools then undergo validation, these aids are artificial creations to assist providers in decision making and are not infallible. In the words of Mel Herbert regarding CDIs in Oct 2013's EMRAP : "you don't need to slavishly follow them."

What does the decision tool add to the clinical context?
  • Is the CDI better than clinician gestalt in pursuing work-up or treatment of a disease process?
    • In the editorial, Green explains this well using the PECARN blunt abdominal tool.  Physician gestalt in ordering CTs for clinically significant abdominal injury: Sensitivity 99%, Specificity 56%.  The PECARN tool offered a sensitivity of 97% and specificity of 42% [1].  Thus, no real added benefit from the tool.
    • Numerous studies investigating pulmonary embolism (PE) have determined that strict application of tools perform no better than physician gestalt within the study populations [5]. 
  • Is the tool usable? Washington University's EM Journal club covered an example of issues with usability ACS CDIs.
Clinical decision aids shouldn't replace gestalt.  
  • CDIs often appear to distill and codify components that comprise gestalt, which may be an enticing way to substitute clinical judgment.  As a medical student, I used these tools to aid in developing gestalt.  However, this could potentially be a bad habit in the making (see next point).
  • Many CDIs utilize gestalt as an entry criteria or as part of the actual aid.  
    • For example, in Tintinalli, Dr. Jeff Kline recommends applying PERC when the gestalt is there's a <15% chance that the patient has a PE, as this was the way in which the CDI was validated [3,4]. Thus, applying PERC to the wrong population may be deleterious.
  • Dr. Seth Trueger posted his PE diagnostic algorithm following an international Twitter debate on pathways and pre-test probability.  The gist of both of these is that a provider should consider the patient's clinical situation and downstream consequences or work up that may result. 

    What clinical question was the decision tool designed to answer?
    • Tools such as the Wells and Geneva scores were designed and validated as risk stratification tools, not rule-out or rule-in criteria.  
      • In this podcast, Dr. Scott Weingart offered some points of clarification on using CDIs to determine which patients to work up for PE.  He also harps on the point above - these scores are not designed to make the decision to work up/not work up a PE.
    • Measured outcome. Does the outcome reflect the clinical parameter you care about?
      • The Canadian Head CT aid seeks to identify head injuries that required neurosurgical intervention, not those that would resolve with no alteration in management.  One must decide whether this is the outcome both provider and patient care about.
    Is the patient part of the applicable population?
    • For example, it's important to note that the Canadian Head CT aid only applies to patients with: GCS 13-15, witnessed LOC, amnesia to the head injury event, or confusion and the authors excluded patients with "minor head injuries" that didn't have one of the aforementioned factors (see this post for more specific discussion of this example) [6].  Broadly applying the tool to patients who don't meet inclusion criteria or were excluded in the studied populations may lead to inappropriate stratification or intervention.
    • The performance of decision aids may depend on the prevalence of disease in the population. For example, PERC and Wells perform less well in high prevalence populations [5].
    • Various other factors such as developing vs developed setting, resources, etc may also alter the applicability of the decision aid in one's population. The more similar a paper's population is to your own, the more usable the decision aid.  For example, some decision aids may rely on a neurological exam performed by a neurologist versus an emergency physician.
    Has the decision aid been validated? If so, how?
    • Once a group derives a CDI, the tool must be validated to test it's rigor.  Dr. Newman gives a great explanation on this podcast (20 min mark). There are a few ways in which this typically happens:
      • Internal or external - validated in the same institution(s) or in other populations
      • Prospective or retrospective - data collected prospectively or retrospectively
      • Statistical or clinical - tool validated through statistical means or in "real life." The latter demonstrates usability and utility. 
      • Example: one can continue a data-collection study of parameters of the derivation portion of the study or one can use the tool in a population going forward to determine clinical utility. This is an example of the latter using the Canadian Head CT aid.
    Know whether a decision tool is a one-way or two-way instrument.  Misapplication of these tools may lead to excessive resource utilization and undermine the specificity of the aids.  [1]
    • One Way Decision Tools - Useful if all criteria are met.
      • Example: If someone is negative by PERC when utilized appropriately, it can indicate that the patient's risk of PE is below the test threshold. Conversely, one cannot say that if a patient is not PERC negative, then they necessitate work up for PE. 
    • Two Way Decision Tools - Can help a clinician decide both when to pursue an action and when not to pursue the action.  The "Ottawa ankle rule" is an example. [1]
    Note: I'm a mere novice with minimal statistics or EBM training, so these thoughts are more to be a reminder for myself than an in-depth analysis.

    References:
    1.  Green SM.  When do clinical decision rules improve patient care?  Ann Emerg Med. 2013 Aug;62(2):132-5. doi: 10.1016/j.annemergmed.2013.02.006. Epub 2013 Mar 30.
    3.  Kline, J.  Thromboembolism.  Tintinalli's Emergency Medicine.  7th ed.  p 434.
    4.  Kline, J. Prospective multicenter evaluation of the pulmonary embolism rule-out criteria. Thromb Haemost. 2008 May;6(5):772-80. doi: 10.1111/j.1538-7836.2008.02944.x. Epub 2008 Mar 3.
    5. Lucassen W, Geersing GJ, Erkens PM, et al. Clinical decision rules for excluding pulmonary embolism: a meta-analysis. Ann Intern Med. 2011 Oct 4;155(7):448-60. doi: 10.7326/0003-4819-155-7-201110040-00007.
    6.  Stiell IG, Lesiuk H, Wells GA, et al.  The Canadian CT Head Rule Study for patients with minor head injury: rationale, objectives, and methodology for phase I (derivation). Ann Emerg Med. 2001 Aug;38(2):160-9.

    Wednesday, August 29, 2012

    Anchors Aweigh! Cognitive Bias - Where IS This Ship Headed?

    The Gist:  We all succumb to cognitive errors from time to time.  Identifying these errors in our medical decision making though exercising metacognition may improve patient safety but it may also allow us to be better clinicians.  NB:  This is not a comprehensive review of all types of cognitive biases, which one can find here in "List 1."  Rather, this is a synopsis of some of the commonest cognitive biases, which I've learned from first-hand.

    Anchoring Bias
     - when a first impression or one piece of evidence exerts undue influence in the diagnostic process.
    • Case:  Listen to a great new blogger/podcaster, Dr. Bob Stuntz, present a case on Anchoring Bias in which he gives an excellent example of the patient who comes in complaining of "I have a kidney stone."
    • Solution: wait until information about the case is complete before forming an impression or selling yourself on a diagnosis.  Note:  clearly in some critical situations one must act before information is complete.   
    Triage Cueing - bias initiated by the patient's initial triage level, assuming that a patient can't be sicker than their triage level.  
    • Case:  A patient was placed in the "minor care" area for a "sore throat."  The patient's PMH included hypertension and the history elucidated that the patient's complaint was more of a dry throat (drinking copious amounts of water) coupled with a yeast infection that wouldn't go away.  She also generally felt terrible and weak.  The attending was initially wary of the idea of a fingerstick glucose level but acquiesced after discussing that polydipsia and intractable yeast infections are harbingers of uncontrolled diabetes.  The result = 587 mg/dL.  Chemistry demonstrated that the patient was in mild DKA, with newly diagnosed diabetes.
    • Solution:  Recognize that patients have the potential to be sick regardless of initial triage level.  Triage cueing may also set up another cognitive bias, Diagnostic Momentum, where a patient's workup is based solely on one diagnosis or label (hand-offs at sign out serve as notorious examples).  
    Premature closure - when one accepts a diagnosis before verification of the diagnosis. 
    • Case: A 48 year old male is transferred from an outside hospital for CHF.  He presented with acute dyspnea accompanied by some pinkish phlegm.  He denies chest pain, pressure, leg swelling, travel, or cough. He was slightly hypertensive, sating 93% on 3L (non-smoker). Troponin was negative, ecg showed potentially new LBBB. Patient was given furosemide and a diagnosis of CHF. Upon arrival to our ED he had a BNP of 52 and was found to have a PE upon further work up since his story of CHF didn't seem to fit with our independent evaluation.
    • Solution:  Look at the evidence that both supports and refutes the diagnosis and, if lacking, obtain appropriate evidence.
    Confirmation bias - look for evidence to confirm the hypothesis rather than searching for evidence to refute.
    • Case:  A 40-something year old patient presents to the hospital with nausea, vomiting, and epigastric pain. The patient has a history of pancreatitis and helicobacter pylori in addition to the all-American trio:  diabetes, hypertension, and hypercholesterolemia.  When the lipase came back over 300 and the bilirubin and transaminases were also fairly elevated, the patient was observed until his pain and nausea were controlled and he passed a PO challenge.  The patient bounced back within 24 hours in heart failure from a sizable MI.
    • Solution:  Look at incoming data objectively before selecting out certain pieces.
    Search Satisfying - the tendency to cease looking for other findings/disease processes once something is found.
    • Case:  A patient presents s/p motorcycle crash with right arm pain.  Exam demonstrates an avulsion injury over the patient's right elbow.  X-rays were negative, the wound was repaired, and the patient was readied for discharge.  Upon an additional exam, the patient had tenderness in the anatomic snuff box and we found the following:
    Scaphoid Fracture!
    • Solution:  Ask yourself - Is there anything else going on here? ATLS has helped decrease the tendency for search satisfying bias in trauma situations through algorithms.
    Availability and Non-availability - the greater prevalence (in the ED,literature,community,news,etc), the more likely we will think of and pursue the diagnosis (and the converse also holds true).
    • Case:  A 4 year old male presents with several days of fever.  He also had cracking of his lips, a maculopapular rash, and cervical lymphadenopathy.  The patient was diagnosed with Kawasaki Disease after a day.  The next several patients that came in with more than a few days of fever got complete workups/evaluation for Kawasaki. 
    • Solution:  Ask yourself - Is the diagnosis based on the case and data or based on something you're comfortable with?  Uncommon things happen too - keep these in mind as well (I'm biased as I love a good Zebra!).
    Ascertainment Bias - one sees what one expects to see (self-fulfilling prophecy)
    • Case: A 34 year old male, well known to the ED and EMS for frequent overdoses, presents with AMS and respiratory depression after his friends watched him shoot up heroin.  The patient was brought in with the diagnosis of overdose and his initial workup and treatment revolved around that one diagnosis.  Eventually the patient required intubation and upon further exam was noted to have unequal pupils.  Although this "frequent flyer" did have some level of overdose going on, the label as a "frequent flyer" and "overdose" initially obscured the fact that he was actively herniating due to a large subdural hematoma.
    • Solution:  Realize that patients who abuse drugs or have "red flag" diagnoses or allergies get sick, too. Look at each patient with fresh eyes.
    As a student, I force myself to generate 5 items on a differential before I present.  Sometimes this is ridiculous and a clear stretch but I use that tiny bit of time to think about why I'm thinking the way I am and potentially identify some of my cognitive bias.  As information comes in from further evaluation, diagnostics, etc I look at the data and integrate it into my leading diagnosis, as well as my differential.  It really doesn't take additional time if I force myself to do it every time.

    We will never be able to eliminate all errors, especially since systems errors play an enormous role in medical errors (and contribute to cognitive error), but perhaps we can train ourselves to reduce those that are in our control.  Life in the Fast Lane provides some succinct case-based insight into cognitive errors with these case scenarios.  There's some argument that recognition of these biases may not translate into meaningful patient outcomes, but I still think it's good form to think with intention and act when necessary.  Also, if you haven't yet, check out Dr. Patrick Croskerry's  free lectures,  on the subject (most span all of clinical decision making and errors).

    References: 
    Croskerry, P. The importance of Cognitive Errors in Diagnosis and Strategies to Minimize Them.  Academic Medicine.  August 2003, Vol 78, Issue 8. p775-780.
    Croskerry, P.  Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making:  Cognitive Strategies and Detection of Bias.  Academic Emergency Medicine.  Nov 2002, Vol 9. No 11.
    Jepson, Zak.  University of Massachusetts.  Medical Student Lecture. August 15, 2012.

    Monday, August 27, 2012

    Thinking About Thinking

    The Gist:  Clinical reasoning in the EM setting is different than other arenas as one must often make life and death decisions (and actions) with limited information and even less time.  Our patients are often undifferentiated and nearly any ailment exists as a possibility.  Furthermore, EPs are constantly juggling multiple patients and responsibilities.  As a result, cognitive errors are common and play a role in clinical decision making (although this also applies to all fields of medicine).  Thinking about thinking or, "metacognition," may help reduce these cognitive errors to allow Emergency Physicians (EPs) to improve diagnostic and treatment decision making.   

    The case that made me care about cognitive errors:  A 40-something year old patient presented to the hospital with nausea, vomiting, and epigastric pain stating "this feels a lot like my pancreatitis."  The patient had a history of pancreatitis and helicobacter pylori in addition to the all-American trio:  diabetes, hypertension, and hypercholesterolemia.  The labs, work up, and patient all seemed to proclaim pancreatitis.  Unfortunately, the patient bounced back within a day in heart failure, status-post massive MI.  Ever since, I've been exceptionally wary of diabetics with nausea and vomiting and garnered a fascination with the thinking of an EP.

    In medical school, we're overtly taught clinical reasoning through data mining in the form of history, physical exam, and diagnostic testing.  I suppose we're subtly and indirectly taught to think about the way we integrate and assimilate this data into a coherent picture of the patient and an accurate diagnosis.  We subconsciously use heuristics, cognitive short cuts, to inform clinical gestalt.  My formal medical education, however, did not include any discussion of cognitive bias or meta-cognition until a resident at a program I rotated at gave a brief presentation on metacognition.
    • Apparently, we can reduce errors if we step back for a moment and think:  What doesn't fit? What have I failed to consider (perhaps a zebra? or a different horse?)?  What biases may be present?  What is leading me to think that this patient has X?
    This is so important that I wanted to disseminate this information to help others who strive to be excellent thinkers and swell clinicians.

    Basic systems of thinking.  Between which we have the capability to toggle, which we should probably exercise more often. Check out this lecture.
    • "System 1" or "Fast":  This is the instinct, intuitive, adaptive, associative, quick thinking.  We use this system when we say, "this patient just looks sick" or "I have this gut feeling the patient has ______."  Caution: medical students and trainees should really not rely on this type of thinking although it is often key in EM (think clinical gestalt)
    • "System 2" or "Analytic":  This is a slower process of thinking which is more deliberate and analytic.
    Common EM thinking patterns:
    • Hypothetico-Deductive Model:  One of the most common cognitive pathways used in medicine - useful in non-critical situations, as algorithms such as ATLS and ACLS tend to dominate in the more critical circumstances.  
      • Main steps:  Generation, Evaluation, Refinement, Verification.  Errors can be present in any step.  
      • Error in Generation - failure to consider a potential diagnosis (influenced by disease prevalence, atypical presentations, etc).  
      • Error in Evaluation - problems in gathering data, interpreting and assimilating the data, and putting the data in the proper context.
      • Error in Verification - failure to ensure that the final diagnosis fits with the clinical picture and established data/workup.
    • Pattern Recognition Model:  This dominates when an experienced clinician uses clinical gestalt to inform the diagnosis rather than generating a complete differential diagnosis (and thereby prone to error for failing to consider alternative diagnoses).
    • Rule Out Worse Case Scenario Model:  Some clinicians employ this most of the time and others tend to apply it when particularly high-risk diagnoses are on the table.  This method of reasoning is expensive and exposes the patient to excess harms through extensive investigations.
    Why may the ED be a breeding ground for cognitive error?
    • High levels of diagnostic uncertainty
    • High decision density and cognitive load
    • High levels of activity
    • Inexperience of some providers (and students)
    • Interruptions and distractions
    • Shift changes
    • Many of these, integrated, produce fatigue
    • These errors occur in every facet of medicine but in EM, there is a certain expectation that EPs not miss the badness (or anything).
    The papers to read (note:  Dr. Patrick Croskerry is a world-reknowned expert in this arena.  If you're looking for even more to read, check out his plethora of articles.  Also, he has several free talks on freeemergencytalks.net, which can be converted to podcasts within iTunes)  


    Life in the Fast Lane provides some succinct case-based insight into cognitive errors with To Err is Human 1 and To Err is Human 2


    Achieving quality in clinical decision making: cognitive strategies and detection of bias - Croskerry


    This article, also by Croskerry has a rather complete list of cognitive errors in the tables embedded in the free text article.



    Other References:
    Jepson, Zak. University of Massachusetts.  Medical Student Lecture. August 15, 2012.

    Tuesday, May 29, 2012

    Clinical Training Wheels

    The Gist:  Emergency Medicine (EM) physicians must read patients and situations quickly and accurately.  Clinical gestalt and decision rules variably aid EM physicians in making vital decisions.  As students, the opportunity exists to build this mysterious, elusive "gestalt" during clinical exposure and to cultivate this as we grow into physician learners.  Clinical decision rules probably serve as an important stepping stone towards the boulder of clinical gestalt, but are accompanied by the potential to serve as a crutch.

    As a medical student, I always seem to finagle a decision aid like Wells', PERC, NEXUS, OTTAWA, or TIMI score into my ED patient presentation. This is my way of overcompensating for my relative clinical naivety - my lack of gestalt.  When the weight of someone's life lies in your judgement, do you trust that over an expert's calculated risk?  Sometimes, however, it seems as though this places me between a figurative rock and a hard place.  The rock symbolizing my fund of clinical knowledge and patient evaluation, whereas the hard place symbolizes the decision of utilizing a clinical decision rule, even if I know it's not that great or I know I'm solely employing the decision aid as a security blanket.  

    What is "clinical gestalt?"
    • A gut instinct, or overall analysis, cultivated by personal experience and established through history and physical.  
    • Evidence suggests that additional years of clinical experience improves ones overall clinical assessment of a patient.  A 2005 study in Chest demonstrated a trend towards increased accuracy in diagnosis of PE in more experienced clinicians, although this did not reach statistical significance.   Strange how that works, eh?  We get better with practice, maybe.  
    What about clinical decision rules?
    • As a student, I innately love these although I know they're fraught with problems and validity issues.  They build a framework and a guideline to substitute for the judgment and gestalt I have not yet cultivated.  The rules seem to back up and quantify the components that might comprise an experienced clinician's gestalt - and it seems there's a rule for nearly everything.
    • Decision rules allow one to assess various aspects of a patient, add up a few numbers (typically countable on two hands), and provide us with a clean, black and white statistic, such as pre-test probability.  Here are calculators for popular PE rules:  the Wells' Criteria and, for low risk patients, the Pulmonary Embolism Rule Out Criteria (PERC).  
    • Offsets risk.  These rules may give a physician a safety net of scientific evidence what they've already surmised with their gestalt.  For example, the Canadian Head CT rule could have a promising impact on reducing the number of CT scans in minor head injury.
    • Clinical decision rules represent a wide variety of levels of evidence, depending partially on the validation of the rule, internally or externally.  Perhaps the numbers aren't as clean as they seem.  
    Clinical decision rules seem easy, shouldn't we just use those?
    • As algorithms, there's the possibility that clinicians may become too dependent on decision rules as opposed to continuing to develop and utilize clinical reasoning and thought.
    • The rules turn out to be nowhere near perfect and the external validation studies rarely seem to concur with the original derivations.  The San Francisco Syncope Rule serves an excellent example of a failure of a decision rule.  The validation studies for this rule, hoping to identify all serious outcomes within 7 days of the presenting syncopal episode, had sensitivities in the 79-80% range, far below an acceptable percentage for ED purposes and well below the touted 96% sensitivity in the original study (1,2).  Of note, clinicians were 100% sensitive in meeting the primary endpoint the rule was designed to detect (3).  
      • Affected by variations in disease prevalence, variable application of the rules by clinicians, and instability of the model from which the rule was derived.
    • Clinical decision rules are not uniformly agreed upon because they exist as a tool, rather than a rule (despite the nomenclature).  
      • This debate between Dr. David Newman and Dr. Scott Weingart is exemplary in demonstrating disagreement between excellent physicians over decision rules in PE.
      • Utilization of these rules could be problematic when it conflicts with a less measurable and quantifiable measure such as clinical gestalt, particularly in the setting of a highly litigious health care climate.
    • Wide variation in use and familiarity of rules exists between academic and community medicine practices.  
    So what do we do?
    • Use a mixture and encourage this practice.   This 2003 analysis in JAMA demonstrated "similar" outcomes in clinicians who used gestalt versus those who used clinical decision rules.
      • This algorithm for PE from EMCrit demonstrates an integration of gestalt with clinical decision rules (where clinical gestalt trumps everything).
    • Historically, EM physicians (lumped together as a group), have pretty good clinical gestalt so use clinical encounters to cultivate away!  
    • As a student, my inclination is that decision rules serve as the building blocks for gestalt, a way of beginning to form those pattern recognition skills.  Additionally, they may prevent us from harming patients (or planning to, before an attending kindly guides us in a more appropriate direction).  Yet, we must cast off our training wheels at some point.
    • Continue the dialogue regarding gestalt and decision rules so that both become better.  See Twitter for banter from the Annual Scientific Meeting of the College of Intensive Care medicine (#CICMASM) where one tweeter stated, "NICE guidelines favor esophageal Doppler, grey haired intensivists favor bedside thought + clinical exam." 
    References:
    1.  Sun  BC, Mangione  CM, Merchant  G, et al.  External validation of the San Francisco Syncope Rule.  Ann Emerg Med. 2007;49(4):420–427. 
    2.  Cosgriff  TM, Kelly  AM, Kerr  D.  External validation of the San Francisco Syncope Rule in the Australian context. CJEM.  2007;9(3):157–161.
    3.  Birnbaum A, Esses D, Bijur P, Wollowitz A, Gallagher EJ. Failure to validate the San Francisco Syncope Rule in an independent emergency department population. Ann Emerg Med. 2008;52(2):151–159.